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Abstract  4 
Partnership is a key idea in current debates about global health and development assistance, 5 
yet little is known about what partnership means to those who are responsible for 6 
operationalising it or how it is experienced in practice. This is particularly the case in the 7 
context of African health systems. This paper explores how health professionals working in 8 
global health hubs and the health systems of South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia understand 9 
and experience partnership. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with 101 professionals 10 
based in each country, Washington DC and Geneva between October 2012 and June 2013, 11 
the paper makes four key arguments. First, partnership has a legitimating function in global 12 
health policy processes for international development institutions, government agencies and 13 
civil society organisations alike. Second, the practice of partnership generates idiosyncratic 14 
and complicated relationships that health professionals have to manage and navigate, often 15 
informally. Third, partnership is shaped by historical legacies, critical events, and 16 
independent consultants. Fourth, despite being an accepted part of global health policy, there 17 
is little shared understanding of what good partnership is meant to include or resemble in 18 
practice. Knowing more about the specific socio-cultural and political dynamics of 19 
partnership in different health system contexts is critical to equip health professionals with 20 
the skills to build the informal relations that are critical for effective partnership engagement. 21 
Key words: Africa, partnerships, health policy, global health and development assistance, 22 
health systems, health professionals 23 
 24 
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Introduction 25 
Partnership is a pervasive idea in policy debates about global health and international 26 
development assistance (Youde, 2014; Rushton & Williams, 2011: Buse & Tanaka, 2011). It 27 
was central to the Millennium Development Goals (8: Develop a Global Partnership for 28 
Development), is core to the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2014), 29 
and is a stated goal of international funders, development agencies, and national 30 
governments. The idea of partnership is also central to debates about the post-2015 global 31 
health and development agenda. Not only is partnership an integral component of the 32 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN, 2015), but there is also recognition that a 33 
renewed sense of partnership holds the key to their successful implementation (UNGA, 34 
2014). 35 
Yet questions remain as to: what does partnership actually mean to those who are 36 
responsible for operationalising it as a policy idea within health systems? How is partnership 37 
currently experienced? And what might this tell us about the continued use of the idea in 38 
global health and development assistance policy? Despite widespread official commitment to 39 
partnership, these questions have received limited attention in existing global health and 40 
development literature.  As a result, partnership continues to remain ‘one of the most over-41 
used and under-scrutinized words in the development lexicon’ (Harrison, 2002:589). While 42 
there is a rich and varied literature on partnership within selected western health system 43 
contexts, such as the UK (see Hunter and Perkins, 2014), there has been limited direct 44 
engagement with the policy of partnership in relation to global health where the context for 45 
partnering is quite different (Moran & Stevenson, 2014); not least because of the significance 46 
of aid transfers to poorer countries and the associated relationships that can emerge in such 47 
settings.  48 
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Existing global health and development literature has tended to approach partnership 49 
in one of two ways: 1) from a pragmatic-instrumental perspective, and 2) from a more 50 
critical position. The first treats partnership as an inherently progressive policy intention, 51 
which should be implemented and, moreover, be implementable in practice. Here, partnership 52 
is understood to be about realising equality, trust and/or mutuality in health and development 53 
relationships and ensuring that recipients of aid in poorer countries, especially national 54 
governments, are empowered as agents of their own health systems and wider development 55 
(Conway et al., 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Youde, 2014).  56 
The need to create more equal and synergistic relationships has been a recurrent issue 57 
in the history of global health and development, with persistent charges of ineffectiveness and 58 
neo-colonialism directed towards external funding agencies (Baaz, 2005; Abrahamsen, 2004). 59 
These criticisms became acute during the 1980s and early 1990s due to conditions attached to 60 
aid provided by agencies such as the World Bank, in an attempt to encourage governments of 61 
poorer countries to enact structural reforms to health systems and the economy. Such 62 
conditionality was widely criticised for being coercive and undermining national ownership 63 
of policy processes (Harman, 2010; Loewenson, 1993; Bhutta, 2001). The idea of partnership 64 
became increasingly popular in health and development circles as a response to these 65 
criticisms. It was not only promoted as a way to return power, influence and leadership to 66 
national actors within low income settings – transforming a donor-driven health and 67 
development relationship into one of equality – but also as a way of ensuring that complex 68 
health and development challenges could be met and resources used effectively (Barnes and 69 
Brown, 2011). Pragmatic-instrumental literature tends to take this understanding of 70 
partnership as given, and focuses on the extent to which these policy intentions have been, or 71 
can in future be, achieved in different health system and development settings. Suggestions 72 
for improving performance have tended however to focus on global institutional design or 73 
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governance of national hosting arrangements (Buse and Tanaka, 2011; Kraak and Story, 74 
2010; Buse and Harmer, 2007), with only limited attention to the politics of partnership 75 
during implementation (Kapilashrami and McPake, 2013). 76 
The second, critical perspective sees partnership differently. Here, it tends to be 77 
understood as a political slogan, misrepresentation or form of empty rhetoric that conceals 78 
other motives and thus largely rebrands ‘old-style’ paternalistic intentions of international 79 
health and development agencies (Baaz, 2005; Crawford, 2003; Fowler, 2002; Impey and 80 
Overton, 2014). According to this perspective, international partners remain in a position of 81 
disproportionate control within partnership, at least in part because they have found it hard 82 
(or never intended) to create more equal, nationally-led health and development relationships 83 
(Baaz, 2005; Impey and Overton, 2014).  84 
Reports of health funding conditionality, issues of coordination within health systems, 85 
and country level challenges associated with pendulum swings in global health (Schrecker, 86 
2014; Williamson, 2008; Hill et. al., 2011) suggest it would be easy to dismiss partnership in 87 
this way. Such reports infer that there remains little local room for manoeuvre, and thus that 88 
partnership has not been translated into real health and development practices. As several 89 
researchers have shown however, local practices are often more contested, complicated and 90 
‘dirtier’ (Kapilashrami and McPake, 2013; Mosse, 2005; Harrison, 2010) than both the 91 
pragmatic-instrumental and critical literature has suggested. These researchers highlight  92 
how policy processes increasingly operate from global to local scales (i.e. within and between 93 
global health hubs and national health systems) and involve a range of partners – in 94 
government, funding agencies and civil society. These groups have diverse agendas and 95 
interpenetrated relationships, and interpret, appropriate and encounter policies differently 96 
(Gould, 2005; Harman, 2010; Kapilashrami and McPake, 2013; Mallarangeng and Van Tuijl, 97 
2004; Mosse, 2005; Sridhar and Craig, 2011).  98 
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As such, ‘partnerships’ are likely to be translated and experienced in different ways 99 
by professionals whose responsibility it is to operationalise the policy from global through to 100 
national levels. There has been limited space for the views of these professionals in current 101 
global health and development literature on the topic (Sridhar and Craig, 2011), and 102 
particularly in the context of African health systems. Thus, we know little about how key 103 
actors understand partnership within African health systems; whether those who are located 104 
at different levels of governance see partnership as a relation of equality or (as suggested 105 
above) as empty rhetoric; or how partnerships work from their perspective in practice 106 
(Aveling and Martin, 2013). This is a significant gap given the pervasiveness of partnership 107 
on global health and development assistance agendas and the immense scope and scale of the 108 
challenges that remain within health systems (Sridhar and Craig, 2011). The implementation 109 
of future global policies relating to partnership will inevitably be shaped by understandings 110 
and past experiences (Mosse, 2005). It is therefore important that such perspectives are 111 
brought forward in order to inform ongoing policy debates about partnership, and to provide 112 
relevant information for professionals who work in partnership settings.   113 
The aim of this paper is to address this gap by reporting findings from in-depth 114 
interviews conducted with professionals working within the global health hubs of 115 
Washington DC and Geneva, and within the health systems of South Africa, Zambia and 116 
Tanzania. By drawing on both global and national perspectives, the paper seeks to present a 117 
multi-sited and systemic understanding of partnership, which not only takes account of the 118 
‘big picture’ of global health and international development (e.g. wider political and 119 
economic factors, institutional structures), but also the relational complexities of everyday 120 
practice (Sridhar and Craig 2011; Aveling and Martin, 2013). The paper outlines the research 121 
process and moves on to discuss professional perspectives on the meaning of partnership and 122 
how it has been operationalised in practice. The paper shows that partnership has a 123 
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legitimating function within global health policy processes, yet there is little common 124 
understanding of how good partnership is practiced or experienced. Partnership is critically 125 
shaped by historical legacies, focusing events, and independent consultants in South Africa, 126 
Tanzania and Zambia, and generates idiosyncratic relationships that health professionals need 127 
the skills to manage and navigate, often informally.  128 
 129 
Methods 130 
The findings reported here come from a wider project looking at global health assistance and 131 
diplomacy. One aspect of the work involved an exploration of the idea and practice of 132 
partnership. A qualitative methodology was employed involving multiple methods. A 133 
detailed policy and literature analysis was conducted in order to: identify formal processes, 134 
events and institutions associated with health policy and partnership working in South Africa, 135 
Zambia and Tanzania; and identify key actors involved in policy conception and delivery 136 
within the global health hubs of Washington DC and Geneva and each African country 137 
(Barnes et. al., 2015).  138 
Washington DC and Geneva were selected as research locations given that prominent 139 
global health institutions are located there, thus affording the opportunity to speak to key 140 
global level professionals. South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia were selected to provide 141 
comparative insights. In terms of comparison, all have stated commitment to partnership at 142 
country-level and have similar national structures for partnership working (see discussion 143 
below). In terms of difference, the gross domestic product and national reliance on external 144 
funding for health was significantly different, thus offering the potential to understand how 145 
wider economic conditions shape partnership experiences.  146 
Having conducted the initial policy and literature analysis, schematic maps were 147 
produced of the formal spaces that exist for partnership within health policy at different 148 
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levels. These informed field research subsequently undertaken at global and national levels: 149 
facilitating the purposeful identification of key informants for interview and meetings to 150 
observe. Potential informants not engaged in formal partnership processes were also 151 
identified (e.g. civil society organisations (CSOs), academics) in order to construct a 152 
balanced understanding of partnership.  153 
In total, 101 professionals participated in semi-structured interviews between October 154 
2012 and June 2013 in each country and in Washington DC and Geneva. Interviews were 155 
conducted with 21 professionals based in the headquarters of the World Bank, Global Fund to 156 
Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), WHO, UNAIDS, USAID and Inter-157 
American Development Bank in one-on-one or group settings. At national level, 80 semi-158 
structured interviews were conducted in South Africa (n=24), Tanzania (n=32) and Zambia 159 
(n=24) with professionals working in: government health and finance ministries, UN 160 
agencies, World Bank, other funding agencies, CSOs and processes associated with the 161 
Global Fund (e.g. Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) and principal recipient 162 
programmes). Professionals working in the East Central and Southern Africa Health 163 
Community (ECSA HC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) were also 164 
interviewed. In Tanzania, the Annual Health Sector Review (October 2012), Fifth P4P 165 
Advisory Committee (October 2012) and Joint Annual HIV/AIDS Technical Review 166 
(November 2012) were observed. 167 
Qualitative data was analysed iteratively via thematic analysis: sorting, labelling, 168 
summarising using pre-agreed themes (e.g. meaning of partnership, challenges, strategies) 169 
whilst also allowing for the identification of emergent ones, detecting patterns and 170 
subsequently developing a detailed understanding of partnership. Exemplary quotations have 171 
been selected to illustrate themes emerging from the data in the sections below.  172 
 173 
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Results and Discussion 174 
Professional perspectives on the meaning of partnership  175 
Of the 101 global health and development professionals interviewed, all were familiar with 176 
and comfortable in using the term partnership. This, to some extent, reflects the pervasiveness 177 
of the idea in global policy debates, and demonstrates that it has been broadly accepted into 178 
the cognitive architecture of global and national health policy actors (Green, 2007; Mosse, 179 
2005). However, interviews revealed that there were clear differences of opinion as to what 180 
partnership means in relation to health and development.  The discussion below summarises 181 
the main ways in which partnership was understood and how different understandings are 182 
significant because they manifest in competing views about which, and how, different 183 
stakeholders should be involved in health governance. 184 
 185 
Competing understandings 186 
A number of professionals across the case study locations discussed partnership in terms of 187 
equal collaboration, mutuality, and comparative advantage: as being about bringing together 188 
stakeholders who have differing skills, backgrounds or knowledge to meet a common 189 
challenge or achieve common goals (e.g. delivery of quality health services or efficient 190 
resource use). Here, a synergistic relationship was envisioned between partners, in which 191 
collaboration would bring more than each partner could achieve on their own:   192 
 193 
The partnership, that means we have to work together, to support each other, 194 
collaborate in doing things to make things more quality together. (16TZOct2012). 195 
 196 
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I think key, for me, is partnership is also looking at what strengths each other have. 197 
Also, it helps in terms of using the resources effectively… if you go into partnership 198 
you find synergies there. (11ZMJun2013). 199 
 200 
In many respects, this perspective reflected the pragmatic-instrumental approach to 201 
partnership highlighted above. As such, those who expressed this view indicated that there 202 
should be scope for different actors to be involved within the health system (a ‘multi-sectoral’ 203 
approach): not only government and international agencies, but also other country-level 204 
stakeholders across civil society and the private sector, with roles and responsibilities to be 205 
determined by relative skills and knowledge (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Conway et al., 2006). As 206 
one UN official in Zambia suggested:   207 
 208 
Partnership is sitting, I see a round table not a table with someone at the head... where 209 
everybody is given a chance to say what they know best, no matter who they are… at 210 
the end you are all able to speak towards what needs to be done… (13ZMJun2013). 211 
 212 
In contrast, some professionals working in CSOs in Zambia and Tanzania indicated 213 
partnership was about more overtly political and participatory ideals: voice, advocacy and 214 
securing broad engagement in health systems processes. Here, partnering was understood as 215 
being about challenging the way health policy was developed and, moreover, about 216 
challenging the perceived dominance of health and other government ministries. There was 217 
also a tendency to discuss partners in terms of power and influence. As one Zambian CSO 218 
professional indicated, ‘I think there is power in coming together’ (19ZMJun2013).  219 
In Washington DC, and for World Bank professionals in particular, partnership also 220 
seemed to be understood in an explicitly political way. Partnership was discussed as being 221 
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about health system governance and, moreover, about governance improvement and reform. 222 
World Bank professionals emphasised the important role of ‘civil society’, noting that CSO 223 
partnerships for health and development had been ‘Jim Wolfensohn’s legacy’ at the Bank 224 
(9WSSep2012). As one official emphasised: 'There is an understanding on our part that this is 225 
the way we do business’ (5WSSep2012). 226 
Finally, and in contrast to the perspectives set out above, other professionals working 227 
in Zambia and South Africa spoke of partnership in a much narrower, contractual way: as 228 
being about financial exchange and driven by global funding (10ZMDec2012, 229 
22ZMNov2012, 24ZMNov2012; 20ZMDec2012; 5SAFeb2013; 1SAMar2013).  Partners 230 
tended to be discussed in terms of their funding roles – who gives and who receives – often 231 
with some mention of differentiation between, for example, multilateral and bilateral funders 232 
and the different ways in which government or CSOs could receive funding (e.g. trust funds, 233 
sub-granting, budget support). For these professionals, partnership resonated more closely 234 
with ‘old-styles’ of aid funding (see above): in which health and development processes are 235 
shaped and driven by donor-recipient aid relations (Crawford, 2003).  236 
The above discussion clearly demonstrates that professionals who are responsible for 237 
operationalising partnership ‘buy-in’ to the idea, yet have different and, indeed, competing 238 
understandings of what it means. To some extent, this is unsurprising given the lack of 239 
conceptual clarity surrounding the term (Barnes and Brown, 2011). Instead, the meaning is 240 
‘worked out’ by professionals as partnerships are operationalised (Mosse, 2005). 241 
Significantly, and as the discussion below demonstrates, key actors must also ‘work out’ and 242 
promulgate their own roles within partnership, so as to legitimise their involvement in health 243 
at global and/or local levels. As we will see, such legitimisation is important because it 244 
allows individuals and organisations to access funding and/or enhance their status, thus 245 
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allowing them to continue operating in what is an increasingly competitive global health and 246 
development industry.  247 
 248 
‘Working out’ roles in a competitive and changing global health context 249 
A number of professionals working in CSOs across South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia were 250 
keen to emphasise that their organisation was ‘different’ to others. Their organisation’s 251 
unique history of engagement in health, accumulated experience, or broad networked 252 
structure were all highlighted as important in terms of either gaining access or being of 253 
ongoing value to local health partnerships. Presenting themselves as ‘different’ seemed 254 
important because it allowed professionals to stake a legitimate claim in partnership 255 
processes. Being seen as a legitimate partner is important for CSOs in Tanzania, South Africa 256 
and Zambia because of the material benefits that partnership can bring, both for individuals 257 
and organisations. Being a partner to Global Fund CCMs can, for example, facilitate access 258 
to global funding. Similarly, being seen as, and subsequently participating as, a legitimate 259 
partner in a range of other partnership spaces (e.g. sector-wide reviews, consultations, 260 
workshops) also helps secure access to funding, given the informal links that can be made 261 
with senior (often influential) officials from international agencies or government bodies, or 262 
through the per diems that may be attached to these meetings (Barnes et al. 2015). Per diems, 263 
in particular, are often an important form of salary support for CSO workers (and also 264 
government officials) contributing to household budgeting and financial planning (Vian et al., 265 
2012), and can thus bring real material benefits to health professionals and their families. At 266 
the same time, given the competitive funding environment that exists for CSOs in South 267 
Africa, Zambia and Tanzania, being accepted as a legitimate partner has an important effect 268 
on organisational sustainability. As one Zambian CSO professional put it: 'Getting money is 269 
life or death for organisations’ (22ZMNov2012).  270 
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A number of professionals working in international agencies also indicated the 271 
importance of ‘working out’ and promulgating their organisation’s role in global and local 272 
partnerships. UN officials based in South Africa, Zambia and Tanzania indicated that their 273 
agencies had a unique role in health, given that they focused on relationship-building and not 274 
money. UNAIDS, for example, was identified as being ‘different’ for brokering relationships 275 
between government, global institutions and other country-level partners, and for providing 276 
technical skills where needed:  277 
 278 
I think part of UNAIDS’ role is we invest a lot of time in building contacts… I 279 
certainly invest a lot of my time in meeting people informally and just chatting about 280 
things (14ZMDec2012) 281 
 282 
World Bank professionals in Washington DC also emphasised that the Bank’s role 283 
was about more than money and emphasised this had become a necessity given recent shifts 284 
in the global aid architecture and type of support that African states (in particular) were 285 
looking for. Bank officials explained, for example, that while ‘the Canadians… have a huge 286 
focus on maternal and child health’ and ‘the Americans have a lot of stake in malaria and 287 
HIV/AIDS’, the Bank offered a broader ‘package’ of technical and financial support 288 
(11WSSep2012, 8WSSep2012): bringing key partners (particularly CSOs) around the table in 289 
dialogue, convening analysis and promoting evidence use. For the Bank, ‘working out’ these 290 
partnership roles was critical given apparent concern about a decline in the Bank’s ‘health 291 
standing’ (9WSSep2012). This has, at least in part, been a function of the increased supply of 292 
other global health funding in recent years, which means Bank support has become less 293 
attractive (Harman, 2015). African states, in particular, have also increasingly sought support 294 
for income-generating infrastructure projects (such as rail or power), rather than health 295 
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systems funding because they provide opportunities to recoup financing to pay off 296 
development loans. In consequence, there was not only a need for the Bank to reemphasise its 297 
role as a global health partner, but to also re-stake its claim as a ‘Knowledge Bank’ for health 298 
systems:   299 
 300 
...the need for direct Bank financing may actually decline however it does not 301 
necessarily mean the need for Bank partnership in other ways as a co-convenor of 302 
high impact fora, an institution that can ask some questions and help bring 303 
experiences from elsewhere to the table, that does not necessarily have to decline… 304 
(1WSSep2012). 305 
  306 
Significantly, this repositioning of the Bank’s global partnership role was seen as a 307 
challenge because of the way in which the Bank’s legitimacy as a partner is judged.  308 
Academics, health professionals, governments and other agencies expect the Bank to 309 
contribute to health systems strengthening (e.g. Hill et al., 2013) and Bank staff suggested 310 
that the Bank’s total financial contribution was often assessed, as opposed to its role in 311 
providing technical support (i.e. knowledge) for health systems: 312 
 313 
…the trouble is the outside world doesn’t measure the composition of our technical 314 
assistance as closely as the composition of our financial assistance, so they see these 315 
things such as the health clinic, the health programme… it’s a side show 316 
(8WSSep2012).  317 
 318 
These insights reveal the complexity and political messiness of partnership. This 319 
complexity stems, at least in part, from the fact that there is no shared meaning for 320 
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partnership and, relatedly, from the fact that there are competing views about which and how 321 
different stakeholders should be involved in health governance. Partnership clearly has a 322 
legitimating function for many actors, which is seldom discussed in existing literature or 323 
policy debate on the topic. This is a critical omission because the legitimisation process is 324 
politically mobilising: it ties the interests of different actors together (Mosse, 2005) precisely 325 
because they all derive their legitimacy, at global and/or national levels from partnership 326 
policy. In other words, the identities and status of different actors are tied up with partnership. 327 
While this facilitates collaboration between professionals who have competing views about 328 
health governance, there is a constant risk of conflict (Lewis and Mosse, 2006); particularly 329 
in instances where noted differences in views about health governance threaten the legitimacy 330 
of particular actors to engage in partnership.  331 
At a broader level, although the instrumentalist intent of partnership may be to 332 
promote collaboration or understanding, in practice many government and civil society actors 333 
in aid-recipient states, to a greater or lesser extent, feel pressure to engage in the ‘right kind’ 334 
of partnership so as to ensure they are seen as reliable and legitimate partners. Engaging as 335 
the ‘right kind’ of partner (i.e. amenable to donor and development partners) is a key way of 336 
maintaining access to decision-making about where funding goes, and/or their position as aid 337 
recipients. This is in many ways an extension of the ‘post-conditionality’ practices identified 338 
by Harrison (2004), whereby African states present reformist measures as a means to attract 339 
continued development aid. 340 
Understanding more about these legitimating functions of partnership is important if 341 
we are to improve how partnerships are conceived and implemented in the future. Indeed, this 342 
is particularly important because, as the next section demonstrates, the dissonance in views 343 
about health governance (noted above) clearly manifest in the way that partnerships for 344 
health are experienced, resulting in: 1) a series of challenges for those who are responsible for 345 
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operationalising the idea; and 2) particular strategies that different actors seek to pursue in the 346 
course of partnership working.  347 
 348 
Professional perspectives about how partnership works  349 
 350 
Commitment and positive progress 351 
Most of the professionals interviewed indicated that there was some level of commitment, 352 
openness and willingness on the part of those they regularly interacted with, at either global 353 
or national level, to work in a collaborative partnership. Many examples of progress to 354 
broaden participation in partnerships for health were highlighted. In particular, improvements 355 
in the nature of the interaction between different groups within South Africa, Zambia and 356 
Tanzania were highlighted, alongside efforts to achieve more balanced forms of 357 
communication. It was reported, for example, that the dynamic between government bodies 358 
and agencies such as the World Bank, USAID and DfID had generally improved in recent 359 
years, with the former now more able to shape the content of the health agenda without being 360 
overtly steered by outside agencies (who had their own preferences). One step forward here 361 
was the formalisation of principles such as ‘country ownership’ in global policy statements, 362 
which provided a common reference point for regulating the actions of aid donors: 363 
 364 
…the scenario has definitely changed from a donor-driven agenda to a country-driven 365 
agenda… the reason is that I think at the global level the policies that have been 366 
developed have deliberately gone that way… when it is written black and white like 367 
that they have to adhere to what they have said... (2ZMNov2012) 368 
 369 
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The existence of institutional frameworks for partnership, which had had time to 370 
‘mature’, as one UN official in Zambia put it (11ZMJun2013), was also widely agreed to 371 
have been a step forward. Technical working groups, annual reviews, subcommittees and 372 
formal networks all exist within the three case study countries. These report and feedback to 373 
each other and provide formal spaces for government ministers, civil servants, CSOs, 374 
development partners, and the private sector to engage. These spaces have all, to some extent, 375 
been set up in response to global statements about partnership relations and (at least in 376 
principle) are intended to work in a coordinated way with other country-level partnerships, 377 
such as Global Fund CCMs (Sridhar and Craig, 2011; Barnes et al., 2015; Sundewall, 2009).   378 
Professionals in each country highlighted the importance of time in building long-379 
term confidence, trust and productive dialogue in not only these formal institutional spaces, 380 
but also in informal interactions. Indeed, confidence and trust were widely reported as being 381 
critical for creating an environment in which such dialogue could occur. A point emphasised 382 
in wider studies within health systems (Farmer, 2011). Also reported as important, and a 383 
positive development in South Africa in particular, was strong leadership in supporting the 384 
process of trust-building, forging informal links and brokering relations where these were 385 
previously strained. Changes to leadership of the South African CCM (SANAC) from 2012 386 
were, for example, reported to have improved communication, resulting in greater efforts to 387 
listen to experts, CSOs, international organizations and provinces. Leaders within the South 388 
African government were also reportedly more willing to engage those previously ‘outside of 389 
the inner circle of friends and trusted organizations’ (9SAFeb2013, 10SAMar2013).  390 
The findings set out above suggest that a common, practical basis for health 391 
partnerships exists in South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, and thus that there are existing 392 
institutional foundations for partnership to work in the SDG era. There was certainly a 393 
general consensus that partnership is an appropriate policy norm and that there have been 394 
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steps to make partnership a reality. The pragmatic-instrumental literature described above 395 
emphasises the importance of the institutional foundations for partnership (e.g. Buse and 396 
Harmer, 2007) and the findings presented here validate this point. Indeed, of particular 397 
significance for current debates about partnership and the SDGs is the recognition that global 398 
statements, whilst somewhat divorced from ‘the day-to-day’, have potential to shape the 399 
framework for relationship-building, and have positively influenced the ability of African 400 
actors to exert control within interactions. This suggests that the incorporation of partnership 401 
as goal 17 in the SDGs, and in future SDG statements, might be an important way to continue  402 
support for country-level control within health systems (UN, 2015).  403 
This is not enough however, given the critical importance of informal relationships 404 
within health partnerships. This is particularly pertinent when thinking about how specific 405 
actors enter into partnership agreements. Formal participation structures dictate that 406 
government agencies and key donors will participate. However who gets to participate from 407 
CSOs is based much more on informal links derived, for example, from revolving door 408 
employment, umbrella groups, and familial and friendship networks. Moreover, leadership 409 
was highlighted as being key at country-level; not just in formal partnership spaces but in 410 
supporting informal trust-building via brokering relations between partners, in and through 411 
interactions which are relatively ‘hidden’ from view (Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Farmer, 2011; 412 
Harman and Rushton, 2013). While the topic of leadership within health systems is under-413 
researched, recent studies have highlighted the multi-polar networks and complex 414 
‘organizational ecology’ within which leaders are embedded, which support such informal 415 
brokerage processes (Chigudu et al., 2014).  416 
 417 
‘Normal’ challenges yet differing agency and control  418 
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Importantly, while the above-mentioned positive steps forward in partnership were 419 
highlighted, a range of challenges were also discussed. To some extent, these were 420 
understood as ‘normal’ given that it was recognised that all working relationships brought 421 
issues that needed to be overcome. As a UN official in Tanzania commented: 'With any 422 
partnerships there’s always some challenges right? (12TZOct2012). The challenges discussed 423 
however, reveal important insights about the agency and level of control that African actors 424 
can exert, which, as discussed below, are constrained by factors including: the historical 425 
legacy of past interaction, critical events, the way consultants engage in partnership 426 
processes, and a lack of clear systems for mutual accountability.  427 
As indicated above, professionals across South Africa, Zambia and Tanzania all indicated 428 
that confidence and trust were critical in supporting productive dialogue between partners. 429 
However, in all countries, these were seen to ‘ebb and flow’ as a result of factors including 430 
changes in external funder priorities and national political leadership. In Zambia, the Patriotic 431 
Front coming in to power in 2011 brought considerable change to ministerial structures and 432 
in the appointment of senior personnel, which a number of professionals (outside 433 
government) indicated had stifled dialogue. Critical events, such as the discovery of the 434 
misappropriation of funds by Ministry of Health staff in 2009 (‘the troubles’) were also 435 
reported to have fractured trust between partners. The situation was similar in Tanzania, with 436 
corruption, European political change, and the global financial crisis all reshaping the context 437 
for collaboration (28TZOct2012). These wider political developments, both nationally and 438 
globally, clearly had an important structuring effect on everyday partnership (Sridhar and 439 
Craig, 2011); shaping both the material basis for partnership (i.e. reduction in aid transfers) 440 
and complicating the relational basis too (i.e. fracturing trust).  441 
 Significantly, professionals working across South Africa, Zambia and Tanzania all 442 
raised concerns about the way consultants (international accountants, private companies, 443 
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national research teams) were engaged in partnership processes. While consultants were 444 
never directly referred to as ‘partners’, there was concern about their level of influence given 445 
that they were often intimately involved in developing partnership documentation, strategic 446 
policy documents, and/or assessing the extent to which partnership indicators or targets had 447 
been met. Preparation of the National AIDS Strategic Framework in Tanzania had, for 448 
example, been ‘outsourced’ to consultants and consultants were contracted in all three 449 
countries to prepare national submissions to the Global Fund and appraise progress. This type 450 
of outsourcing is increasingly common across African health systems (and indeed occurs in 451 
policy processes outside health) (Sridhar and Craig, 2011; Gould, 2005). The concern here 452 
was that consultants often end up doing so much work that they are extremely instrumental in 453 
final policy decisions (see also Sridhar and Craig, 2011). Although the work of consultants 454 
can capture elements of partnership when exercised in concert with government and other 455 
stakeholders, it risks becoming a way for local partners to abdicate responsibility, or for 456 
consultants to promote particular preferences (such as those of the external agencies they are 457 
often funded by) where there is weak internal organisation. 458 
Professionals were especially critical of the actions of some partners and, in 459 
particular, those of the Global Fund. Across all countries, the Global Fund was widely 460 
regarded as a ‘challenging’ partner, given the organisation’s inflexible, bureaucratic and 461 
constantly changing processes for accessing and managing funding. These issues were 462 
generally seen as being restrictive, creating internal pressure to change existing 463 
governance systems to meet demands (sometimes reasonably or unreasonably) and as a 464 
threat to local coordination. These issues are not unique to South Africa, Tanzania and 465 
Zambia, with similar problems reported in, for example, Cambodia (Aveling and Martin, 466 
2013) and India (Kapilashrami and McPake, 2013).  467 
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There was some reluctance to raise these issues directly with the Fund in Tanzania 468 
and Zambia for fear of jeopardising financial flows. In contrast, critical views were 469 
particularly strong in South Africa wherein the Fund was commonly referred to as a 470 
'failing' partner by private sector, UN and government officials alike. One government 471 
official went so far as to suggest the Fund was engaged in 'economic colonization’ 472 
(6SAFeb2013). These critical views were, in part, an expression of local frustration about 473 
the particular way in which Global Fund CCMs have been a tool for political and health 474 
brinkmanship in South Africa (wherein provinces like Western Cape could outscore 475 
national performance on health thus making their claims for national autonomy more 476 
salient) (Barnes et al. 2015). They also signify however, a greater ability of South African 477 
professionals to ‘push-back’ against Global Fund partnership requirements than those in 478 
Zambia and Tanzania, who felt unable to hold the Fund to account:  479 
 480 
… since we are the ones that want the money, they always have the upper hand... 481 
most of the time because we are the recipient NGO, we end up saying okay, fine, I 482 
agree with all of the above and you sign (18TZOct 2012). 483 
 484 
In terms of explaining this, South Africa is less economically dependent on external 485 
financing than both Tanzania and Zambia, and this, at least in part, seems to affect the 486 
freedom afforded to professionals working in the South African health system to express 487 
their views and thus exert control within partnerships (Barnes et. al., 2015). In other 488 
words, the extent of economic dependency affords them greater ‘negotiating capital’ and 489 
political leverage in decision-making (Gould, 2005; Whitfield, 2010).  490 
Significantly, underpinning accountability problems is the uncertain legality and 491 
consequences of what happens when one partner does not meet expectations. Partnership 492 
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relations are often formalised in local forms (e.g. Memorandums of Understandings 493 
(MoUs), donor-recipient financial agreements), which are intended as institutional 494 
mechanisms for partners to hold each other to account (Sundewall, 2009). There are, 495 
however, problems with the way in which these mutual accountability mechanisms are 496 
developed and adjudicated in practice. Not only do partnership MoUs have limited legal 497 
standing (and are therefore of limited value when disagreements occur, as was the case 498 
with the Zambian ‘troubles’ of 2009), but there is also confusion as to which law 499 
arbitration clauses in financial agreements pertain. Interviewees were either uncertain 500 
about this or assumed that contracts fell under South African/Tanzanian/Zambian law. The 501 
reality, however, is that this depends on the country and funder:    502 
 503 
…arbitration clauses start by saying that if there is a difference we will try and 504 
amicably resolve… If it fails we will try the arbitration law of the implementing 505 
country… And the arbitration act says you appoint an arbitrator who is mutually 506 
acceptable to both parties…There are times when the donor has insisted that the 507 
applicable law… will be like the US but we have refused… (2ZMNov2012). 508 
 509 
The idea that the default law is not that of the country in which a partnership is 510 
implemented suggests a legal asymmetry to partner relations that has not been fully 511 
explored in existing research. Moreover, it suggests an asymmetry in which African 512 
stakeholders could have limited effective control over funding partners. There are 513 
certainly strategic efforts to more robustly hold external agencies to account in each 514 
country. The Tanzanian government is, for example, seeking to formally assess donors 515 
annually (28TZOct2012). There are questions however, as to how this will play out in 516 
practice, and the strategies that might be employed to navigate the accountability process. 517 
22 
 
It will be important to generate more evidence about these accountability issues in order to 518 
construct more balanced partnerships in future.   519 
A final issue relates to the way in which formal partnership structures operate in 520 
practice. While formal spaces for interaction were generally regarded by most African and 521 
global health professionals as a step forward in terms of supporting collaborative relations, 522 
there was widespread concern these were not working optimally. A range of difficulties 523 
were discussed, which not only related to technical issues of management, but also to the 524 
micro-politics of interaction.  525 
Professionals in Zambia and Tanzania (from CSOs, government and external agencies 526 
alike) expressed concern about the volume of ‘cumbersome’ meetings which took up time, 527 
indicating that debate tended to be ‘process-orientated… rather than substantive dialogue’ 528 
(28TZOct2012). This not only resulted in few clear decisions, but also limited informal 529 
discussion and wider ‘blue-skies’ thinking about how to address health system issues: 530 
 531 
… we could spend all day everyday in a committee or meeting… people aggregate the 532 
partnership responsibility to that structure. So they think that we don’t need to discuss 533 
things over a coffee or a lunch because that has been taken care of…  it doesn’t 534 
necessarily occur to them that you can do something differently (14ZMDec2012) 535 
 536 
Others, including professionals in South Africa, questioned whether the right technical health 537 
groups were represented and expressed frustration about the shifting and sometimes 538 
competing orientations of external agencies, which undermined how discussion and decision-539 
making progressed; a view supported by some professionals who were themselves working in 540 
external agencies: 541 
 542 
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…there are real fundamental problems with the way development assistance is 543 
working here… Policy dialogue with government and donors, they don’t spend a lot 544 
of time talking to each other… we as donors haven’t got our act together, let alone 545 
engage with government.  (12TZOct2012) 546 
 547 
Crucially, the lack of productive dialogue in formal institutional spaces also partly 548 
appears to be a result of active political strategies employed by government health officials, 549 
and thus reflects the way these professionals exert their agency within partnership. 550 
Government silences within formal meetings, in which donors are left to talk, can, for 551 
example, be an attempt to obfuscate decisions and thus evade the control of outside agencies 552 
(7TZOct2012). Similarly, it can be a strategic practice for senior officials to send junior staff 553 
to meetings, who do not have delegated authority to debate issues, in order to continue 554 
government activity ‘behind closed doors’ away from donor view. While reflective of 555 
African agency in partnership relations, these practices can be the source of local frustration, 556 
consume time and creative energy (Eyben, 2010), and result in paralysis in moving forward 557 
with decisions that require partner input:  558 
… there is some delegating taking place here and you have junior people, that is the 559 
general story, not being able to take decisions… its felt a bit offensive on DP 560 
(development partner) side. (28TZOct2012). 561 
These examples illustrate that government stakeholders are able to exert some level of 562 
control over the pace and timing of partnership relations; deploying strategies which seek to 563 
deflect the oversight of funding agencies (Bergamaschi, 2009; Gould, 2005, Mosse, 2005). 564 
Yet, as the above discussion on the role of consultants and accountability relations illustrates, 565 
they do so from an uneven footing and operate within a complex set of everyday partnership 566 
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practices which we still know relatively little about. Of particular concern is the lack of 567 
dialogue and ‘blue skies’ thinking noted above, which is arguably contributing to deliberative 568 
closure (Eyben, 2010), in Tanzania and Zambia in particular. This process effectively 569 
‘produces ignorance’ (Mosse, 2005) about health systems issues; closing down opportunities 570 
for professionals to learn from, challenge and address them.  571 
 572 
Conclusion 573 
This paper has explored what partnership means to those responsible for operationalising it as 574 
a policy idea within health systems and to understand how partnership is experienced within 575 
existing practice. It is clear that partnership as a global policy making framework has 576 
emerged as an accepted norm by professionals working in the global health hubs of 577 
Washington DC and Geneva, and in the health systems of South Africa, Zambia and 578 
Tanzania. The practice of partnership reveals idiosyncratic and political properties that 579 
professionals working in global health must regularly manage. Being involved in partnership 580 
has an important legitimating function for health policy stakeholders and where this 581 
legitimacy is brought into question it risks setting up relations of competition and conflict 582 
(Mosse, 2005). Partnership relations are further challenged by the historical legacy of past 583 
interaction and critical events, and are skewed by the way local or international consultants 584 
are engaged in the process and by a lack of clear systems for mutual accountability (Sridhar 585 
and Craig, 2011). 586 
Global efforts to institutionalise the principle of partnership have been one means of 587 
enhancing the ability of African government officials, in particular, to more fully control 588 
health agendas and there is evidence to suggest that practical strategies are being employed 589 
within partnership relations in order to consolidate national ownership. Consolidating these 590 
within the SDG process will be a further way to balance the uneven global health and 591 
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development playing field within African health systems. To focus on institutional 592 
mechanisms however, is not enough (Kapilashrami and McPake, 2013; Aveling and Martin, 593 
2013). The key to better partnership rests with better understanding the more political 594 
elements of partnership practices, the way strategies are deployed to appropriate partnership 595 
processes and evade control (Whitfield, 2010; Bergamaschi, 2009), and the way closer 596 
relationships of trust can be brokered (Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Mosse, 2005). Such 597 
knowledge is important because it provides crucial information about the socio-cultural 598 
constraints and political dynamics of partnership, upon which health professionals can evolve 599 
their own practices and build the informal relations that are critical for effective engagement. 600 
Given that leadership and informal brokering are important here, it is crucial that health 601 
professionals have skills in these areas. This suggests a need to ensure that professional 602 
training covers topics such as politics, negotiation and diplomacy, so that those responsible 603 
for operationalising partnership are able to forge and negotiate effective informal 604 
relationships.  605 
Finally, the global health and development assistance community generally expect 606 
policy to be informed by evidence. This appears not to have been applied to policy relating to 607 
partnership. This is a critical omission given that partnership continues to direct global health 608 
and development policy processes (UN, 2015). The findings here illustrate the importance of 609 
generating qualitative evidence about what partnership means in different contextual settings 610 
to those who practice it, so as to more fully understand: whether and how partnership can 611 
advance and/or delimit other health policy objectives; and appraise what avenues exist to 612 
reform both the institutional and relational aspects of partnerships in ways that increase 613 
prospects of success. One of the values of the idea of partnership is that it is a policy norm 614 
that brings disparate groups together around a shared concept. Ongoing perceived failures in 615 
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the practice of partnership risk delegitimising this norm and could ultimately result in 616 
weakened forms of global health cooperation.  617 
 618 
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